• Diotima@kbin.social
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      9 months ago

      Except that’s not true. Somehow, 23andme missed the almost certainly anomalous activity on thier network that lead to the extraction of 6.9 million users’ data. Missing the activity associated with the massive data dump, designing thier system to allow for that? 100% thier fault.

      One should not be able to use a set of hacked accounts to dump that much data. That’s a design flaw.

      • SheeEttin
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        9 months ago

        That’s not really a system design question, it’s a DLP question.

        • teichflamme
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          9 months ago

          It’s also an access control and authorization concept question

        • Diotima@kbin.social
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          9 months ago

          Process design, procedure design. Or perhaps just a failure to bother with pesky things like monitoring and such. Maybe we’ll find out if it goes to court.

    • SeaJOP
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      9 months ago

      As someone in that data breach (not from reused passwords) and of Jewish descent (the seeming target of the hack), I’m going to say it is not blown out of proportion. They previously had no limits on failed login attempts which is pathetic from a security standpoint. They still don’t require 2FA. They say they courage it but it’s not like they bug you about it.

      So they failed at multiple points prior to the hack and still fail after. They do have a limit on failed logins now so they have done part off the base level of security.