- cross-posted to:
- china@lemmygrad.ml
- china@lemmy.ml
- cross-posted to:
- china@lemmygrad.ml
- china@lemmy.ml
Full conclusion:
This article explores the mechanism and characteristics of the WPD in China, which is strongly advocated by the CCP under Xi Jinping’s rule through extensive fieldwork and in-depth interviews in Shanghai. Four types of WPD are discussed and analyzed based on a participation-response analytical framework, i.e., participation for policy suggestion, participation for mobilization, participation for complaints and supervision, and participation for self-governance. The findings of this study provide valuable insights into the democratic governance in communist regimes and the theoretical development of socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. WPD is a special institutional design that emphasizes regulated public participation and selective government responsiveness. The cases of the 12345, community consultative conference, grassroots legislation, and the installation of elevators in old public housing areas demonstrate that WPD has successfully facilitated local officials’ response to people’s demands and engaged more public opinion in the policymaking process. It also provides a channel for the public to express their concerns and has led to more effective solutions to specific issues. In this way, the practice of WPD helps to consolidate and legitimize political power by opening up more channels of public participation and efficient government response.
Yet unlike western democracies that rely on public scrutiny of the government and competitive elections, the response of local officials under WPD is more dependent on the assessment of higher authorities and their expectations for promotion. Public participation is state-mobilized, and people express their voices, exercise their powers, and supervise the government in a conditional manner. Although this study adds to the ongoing discussion on China’s democratic practices and the role of public participation in China, it also has limitations because it is largely based on evidence from Shanghai. The impact of WPD on the people’s political trust towards local government and the public’s evaluation of it may vary in different places in China. This deserves further study in the future.